data) indicate that social benefits have not contributed to improve household welfare or reduce poverty. Double difference estimates point to a negative impact on welfare. Parametric estimates do not yield any consistent significant impact on welfare or poverty. The author concludes that the growth in population coverage and expenditure on cash benefits that characterized social assistance policies in recent years has not resulted in a significant improvement in welfare, all other factors being equal.
Introduction
The first decade of the transition to a market economy has been very difficult for the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). All the 15 Republics that constituted the Union experienced a deep recession between 1990 and 1995 with an average fall in GDP of about 40%. As they were starting to recover in 1996 and 1997, Russia defaulted on its debt and unleashed a financial crisis that reached all FSU republics with a subsequent new fall in GDP of several percentage points.
Hidden and open unemployment and poverty increased consistently during the decade leading to a severe decline in living standards (WB 2005) . Understandably, the populations of these countries have lived the 1990s as a painful experience that overshadowed the initial enthusiasm for reforms. This is also the story of Moldova, a small FSU republic that suffered severe economic consequences following the desegregation of the Soviet Union, transitional reforms and the 1998 Russian financial crisis. By 1999, Moldova had lost almost 60% of its GDP 2 and had an estimated poverty rate (headcount index) of 71% (WB 2004) . As for other countries in the region, the economic situation started to improve after the beginning of the new millennium. Can poverty reduction be attributed to specific pro-poor government policies or is more generally the product of economic growth?
This paper addresses this question by focusing on one policy instrument which is specifically designed to support the poor and the vulnerable: social assistance benefits in cash (henceforth 'social benefits'). We carry out a welfare impact evaluation of social benefits using household panel data that cover the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The purpose is to try to isolate from other effects the impact of social benefits (and their increase) on the welfare of Moldovan households and assess in this way the merits of social assistance policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on poverty and social assistance in transition. Section 3 looks more in detail at the Moldovan case. Section 4 discusses some of the key issues we are confronted with in making a retrospective impact evaluation. Section 5 outlines the evaluation strategy we opted for. Section 6 illustrates data and variables used and section 7 discusses the results. Section 8 concludes.
Poverty and social assistance in transition
The social protection system in the FSU countries went through important changes during the 1990s. The Soviet system did not really make a distinction between social insurance and social 2 See http://www.cisstat.com/eng/mac-01.htm assistance. As all adults were expected to work and provided with the same means, social protection was designed around the needs of the workforce or confined to a set of 'pensions' granted to citizens who were not able to work such as the disabled. The transitional recession and the growth in unemployment and poverty changed this scenario drastically and governments found themselves unequipped to deal with these new challenges. With the support of international institutions, FSU countries embarked on a program of social protection reforms. The distinction between social insurance and social assistance became more important as the pension funds were made extra-budgetary and the informal sectors were expanding quickly leaving large sections of the populations unprotected. It became also necessary to shift from a categorical type of cash
benefits to a means-tested system in order to focus attention on the real poor.
In many FSU republics, social protection reforms are still largely incomplete and the evaluation of such reforms is in an early stage. In particular, reforms have largely focused on social insurance relegating social assistance to a backstage role which explains the scarce attention of researchers to such instruments. This is also explained by the fact that the household budget surveys which are necessary to evaluate public transfers are still few and discontinuous.
There are, however, some studies that evaluated public transfers in transitional economies combining social insurance and social assistance transfers. Milanovic (2000) looked at social protection transfers in Latvia using one cross-section survey. He finds a weak pro-poor role of social protection benefits but does not distinguish between social insurance and social assistance benefits and provides an incidence rather than an impact evaluation. Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) analyzed the role of the social safety net in protecting the poor from the 1998 Russian financial crisis. They use two spells of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and a rather broad definition of government transfers that includes social assistance and social insurance. They conclude that the social safety net in place was largely insufficient to protect the poor from the Russian crisis.
Welfare impact evaluations of social assistance benefits in other countries in transition outside the FSU are also scarce. Ravallion et al. (1995) looked at the early years of the transition in Hungary and focused on the role of the social safety net in protecting people from poverty and promoting their escape from poverty. Combining social insurance and social assistance benefits, they found that the safety net was able to protect effectively from poverty but did not play an important role in lifting people out of poverty. Van de Walle (2003) followed in the steps of this last paper to test the public safety net in Vietnam and found a very marginal role of the social safety net in protecting people from poverty or promoting an exit from poverty. Okrasa (1999a and 1999b) has used a four years panel survey from Poland to assess the impact on poverty of the public safety net using a survival analysis. The transfers considered are family allowances and unemployment benefits and the author finds a general positive impact on redistribution, a positive but moderate impact on reducing the poverty spell and a positive impact on exiting poverty with all these effects being different depending on the household prototype considered.
The present study may be the first to focus exclusively on the welfare impact of social assistance benefits in a transitional economy. The distinction between social assistance and social insurance is not a trivial one for welfare evaluations. Social insurance relates to the world of work and is designed to protect past and present workers from risk (old age, disability, work injury, unemployment, maternity). Social insurance benefits are granted based on contributions and irrespective of welfare status. By contrast, social assistance benefits are specifically designed to assist the poor and the vulnerable irrespective of whether they have contributed to social insurance schemes or not. Only social assistance benefits are specifically designed to alleviate poverty and for this reason they are a better candidate for evaluating pro-poor government policies. Despite the growing needs, the social assistance system lagged behind in terms of reforms. In the Soviet Union, the system did not distinguish between social insurance and social assistance and welfare benefits were characterized by an emphasis on special categories of citizens such as the war veterans, children and the disabled. During the 1990s, the transitional recession and attempted reforms led to contrasting effects. On the one hand, reforms aimed at two major objectives including the separation of social insurance from social assistance and the transition of social assistance from a categorical to a means-tested system. The first objective was principally designed to make social insurance independent and extra-budgetary. The second objective aimed at focusing scarce resources on the poor. On the other hand, financial resources were quickly shrinking because of the recession preventing these same reforms from being implemented. By the end of the 1990s, the government of Moldova had substantially reduced the number and size of social assistance benefits and had also accumulated a certain amount of arrears in payments without really implementing structural changes. 
The case of Moldova

Key issues
We are confronted with a retrospective evaluation. There was no design to evaluate social assistance benefits before the program was launched and we cannot rely on a randomized experiment and/or household surveys which were specifically designed for evaluating social assistance benefits. This is the rule rather than the exception in transitional economies. These countries face financial and skills constraints which limit the funds and capacities to undertake a proper evaluation design.
The social program we are evaluating is expected to be affected by most problems which are typical of evaluations of this kind including selection bias and lack of a proper comparison group, unobserved heterogeneity, model endogeneity and measurement error. Selection bias accrues from the fact that the group of households that received social benefits -the treated group -was not randomly selected by the government. This group may be very different in terms of its characteristics from the group of households that did not receive social benefits -the untreated 3
Benefits for children in age 0-3 and material assistance are supposed to be accompanied by means-tests but in reality the system preselects categories of beneficiaries making the means-test an almost redundant exercise.
group -which is therefore a poor choice of counterfactual.
Several factors which determine program selection are not observed in our data and some of the observed factors are likely to be plagued by endogeneity and measurement error. Participation to the program depends on the application decision on the part of the household and on the selection decision on the part of the government. On the household decision, we do not have any information about whether the household has applied for benefits or not. On the government decision, we know that benefits are assigned to predetermined categories of citizens such as children, the disabled and the war veterans but we cannot identify from the survey the exact categories that correspond to each benefit. For example, we do not know the category of disability or the war veteran status. Nor, we can distinguish those variables that determine the household decision from those variables that determine the government decision. For example, having many children may be a factor that induces households to apply for benefits because poor households tend to have many children but is also a categorical criteria used by the government to assign benefits.
The social benefits program also suffers from mismanagement and not all benefits are assigned to those who are supposed to be targeted. Disability status is a gatekeeper for a whole range of benefits and it is widely recognized in Moldova that the commission that grants disability status is not sufficiently transparent in its decisional process. Endogeneity may arise due to the fact that some of the unobserved criteria used for program selection may be correlated with observed variables. Also, the proxy-means tests in place for two of the existing benefits are only subsequent to the categorical criteria and result in significant targeting error type I (non coverage of poor people) and targeting error type II (coverage of rich people). Again, these are not exceptional circumstances for an evaluation of government transfers in transitional economies but the rule.
In substance, program selection is not entirely deterministic but contains several sources of stochasticity. The social assistance scheme has also expanded during the period considered and this has occurred in concomitance with output growth and poverty reduction which means that we also need to disentangle the impact of social assistance transfers from the impact of growth.
Evaluation strategy
Our objective is to evaluate the impact of social assistance benefits on household welfare and poverty. We use four consecutive rounds of a household budget survey (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) ) that covers income and consumption and which measures the social assistance benefits received by households (more on the survey in the data and variables section). We also know that the social benefits program was already on-going in our period one and expanded throughout the four year period considered.
Let i be our unit of interest -the household -with n i ,. as follows:
We call We propose a three steps evaluation process. The first step involves estimating the transition probabilities between different welfare groups over time. The advantage of this approach is that is very versatile and provides information which can be used for at least four different exercises: 1)
An assessment of the upward and downward mobility of households across welfare groups and time; 2) An assessment of the role of social benefits in fostering or hampering such mobility; 3)
Two separate tests that assess the ability of social benefits to protect the non-poor from falling into poverty (PROT) and to promote the poor to exit poverty (PROM); 4) A poverty incidence evaluation.
For the first exercise it is sufficient to read the transition probability matrix between two time periods in the presence of benefits. This provides information on household mobility across welfare groups. For the second exercise and if we estimate the transition probability matrix also in the absence of social benefits, we can use the percentage of households in each cell of the transition 4
Note that the comparison group is not necessarily the group of non treated households observed in the data. The latter can be one of the possible choices of comparison groups and -as already explained -not a good choice for our specific case.
matrices to measure changes in probabilities with and without benefits.
A similar procedure can be used to calculate the PROT and PROM tests. These tests have been developed by Ravallion et Al. (1995) 
Positive values of these measures will indicate that social benefits have been able to protect the non-poor from poverty and promote the poor out of poverty. Using the same two transition matrices (in the presence and absence of social benefits) we can estimate the incidence of social benefits on poverty and on different welfare groups. To estimate the incidence on poverty, it is sufficient to read the columns totals and compare these figures in the estimates with and without benefits.
These are useful information but we constrained the analysis to the sphere of incidence evaluations where the comparison group is simply the population without social benefits. We have not really constructed yet a proper comparison group able to deliver an impact evaluation.
For this purpose, the second step will be to mimic a randomized experiment and then use a double difference ( or 'difference in difference' method to estimate the impact of benefits on welfare. In our two years scheme, groups A and B did not participate in the program in time 1 while in time 2 only group B participates. If group A and B were identical in all respects in time 1 then the social benefits program could be considered as randomly assigned. In our data, group A happens to be very large while groups B, C and D are smaller (the coverage of benefits is low). With propensity score matching we can extract from group A in time 1 the nearest match to group B in time 1. We can then compare changes in welfare of the two groups during the period with the double difference method as follows:
where is the expected value (the mean) of welfare. Positive values of
that social benefits had a significant impact on welfare.
The DD estimator is generally used to address the problem of endogenous placement that arises from single difference estimators. The aim is to compare participants and non participants pre and post intervention. selection bias which is time-invariant. If this is the case, the DD estimator is unbiased and the program impact is correctly estimated (Ravallion 2008) . In our case, we can relax the time-invariant assumption given that we do not use group A as a comparison group but a match of group B extracted from group A. One problem may instead arise from the fact that we need to use the panel component of the surveys rather than the two full cross-section surveys. 6 We need to trace the same households between period 1 and 2. This implies a certain attrition resulting in a loss of observations and a possible loss of sample representativeness. This potential loss will be assessed by testing means equality of the balanced and unbalanced panels.
The third step will be to exploit the availability of a four years period for a longitudinal parametric analysis. We regress the intensity of benefits (conditional on a number of other variables) on a measure of welfare and the social benefits status (conditional on a number of variables) on the poverty status as follows: To check for results consistency across models specified with different sets of regressors we use 6
Note that the standard DD approach does not require a panel structure (Ravallion 2008). 7 We excluded the pooled OLS because this estimator would provide bias estimates given that we expect significant endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity. We also excluded dummy variable regressions (LSDV) because this is practical only when N is small and Instrumental Variables (IV) models because they rely on assumptions about the instrument that cannot be tested. Dynamic panel models were excluded because they would require IV specifications to be unbiased. A conditional fixed-effects logit model was also excluded because it drops observations where the treatment variable does not change over time. In our data, these are groups A and D which would mean wasting most of the dataset. Among error components models we opted to use both FE and RE models. A RE model assumes no covariance between the explanatory variables and the error term that represents person specific and time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This would be a rather unrealstic assumption. In a country like Moldova, unobserved factors such as individual contacts matter a great deal for finding a job or accessing cash benefits. However, this model has the advantage of accomodating all types of regressors including time invariant and cross-section invariant regressors. This is important because we want to test the model conditional on variables such as rural location or the season when the interview took place which would be dropped in a FE model. With a fixed (within) effects model the problem of time constant unobserved heterogeneity is addressed but the model uses information only on the 'movers' wasting information on the 'stayers'. The FE model also assumes that the independent variables and the idiosyncratic error term are independent. In reality and in our case such endogeneity may arise from systematic shocks due to macroeconomic factors such as growth (period effect), omitted variables such as those variables that explain program selection and are not observed, shocks that can also affect regressors such as changes in growth that may lead to changes in labor market conditions (simultaneity) and measurement error which we know we have. Autocorrelation in the disturbance term may also be an issue as people who have already successfully applied for benefits may apply again or simply continue to be granted benefits with no further enquiry 8 .
We can address period effects by introducing time dummies in the fixed (within) effects model and this partly addresses simultaneity and we can also estimate a within effects model with autoregressive disturbance term. We opted instead to use macroeconomic variables which identify the 8 As already mentioned, some of the factors that determine the decision to apply are likely to be non observed in the data.
macroeconomic shocks that occurred during the period considered. We know that between 2001
and 2004 Moldova enjoyed sustained growth and that employment has improved during the period.
We can use the growth and the employment rates as regressors in place of time dummies and check the impact of these shocks on the social benefits parameter.
In conclusion, the RE model is an obliged choice for comparing models with all forms of regressors. The FE model with the macroeconomic variables is probably the best choice to address issues of unobserved heterogeneity, period effects and simultaneity but it drops time invariant regressors. The BE model is less relevant but is a useful counterfactual to the FE model which is a within effects model and focuses on time invariant effects. As a measure of welfare we use real monthly consumption per capita divided by the poverty line . This is a standard approach in similar studies (Ravallion et Al. 1995 , van de Walle 2003 .
Data and variables
Consumption is expected to be a better measure of welfare than income given that income is underreported and is more sensitive than consumption to seasonal variations. We use real to 0.14. However, this decline has been accompanied by a remarkable growth in coverage (from 5.7% to 19%) which explains the growth of average benefits per capita in the population (Table 1) .
The government clearly opted to increase expenditure and coverage rather than focusing on proper targeting based on means tests and the fine tuning of individual transfers.
)
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The transition probability matrices would suggest a positive incidence of social benefits on poverty. Table 2 reports the transition probabilities between poor and non poor. The first two columns in Table 3 report the difference between these probabilities estimated with and without benefits. Positive values indicate an increased probability of moving across poverty groups in the presence of social benefits and vice-versa for negative values. To check for consistency, we repeated the estimations using the balanced and unbalanced four years panels and also the balanced panels for the three periods 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 . We can see that the values for the transition from poor to non-poor (P-NP) are all positive while the values for the transition from non poor to poor (NP-P) are all negative.
The PROT and PROM tests proposed by Ravallion (1995) confirm these findings with positive values for both PROT and PROM for all estimates (Table 3 , columns 3 and 4). 12 The poverty headcount index in the presence of social benefits is also lower than in the absence of benefits for all estimates (Table 3 , column 5). In substance, the presence of social benefits enhances the probability of moving from poor to non-poor and reduces the probability of moving from non-poor to poor. As already mentioned, the problem with this procedure is that we ignore the issue of the reference group using the untreated individuals as comparison group unconditional on household characteristics.
The double difference estimates with matched samples provide a rather different picture. Table   4 reports the relevant statistics for each group and the respective match over each of the three periods considered. When we compare those who joined the social benefits scheme (group B) with a matched sample extracted from those who did not join (group A) we find that all DD estimates are negative. This indicates that joining the scheme did not improve welfare for the treated everything else being equal. As a counterfactual, we estimated the DD measures comparing those who left the scheme (group C) with a matched sample extracted from those who continued to stay in the scheme (group D). Leaving the scheme seems to improve welfare everything else being equal. From these estimates, social benefits seem to have a negative effect on welfare.
The disadvantage of the double difference approach as we designed it is that we constrain the sample to a rather small number. This is due to the fact that coverage is initially low and that the treated group is small. On the other hand, if the matched sample is valid, estimates should be 12
Note that columns 1 and 4 in table 3 report the same values. That is because the PROM test is reduced to the difference of the transition probabilities between estimates with and without benefits. consistent and close to a randomized experiment. Also, double difference estimates and a randomized experiment can miss on some of the behavioral effects that may arise from unobserved heterogeneity such as differences in individual abilities. During a period of sharp growth such as the one we observe, those who profit from and contribute to growth are probably the most skilled, with better contacts and social abilities, all attributes which are difficult to measure in household surveys. This motivates the third step in our analysis where we use longitudinal data to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Tables 5a and 5b report random effects estimates using all 16 possible specifications and the balanced and unbalanced panels.
13 Table 5a illustrates results for the welfare equations and 5b for the poverty equations. For simplicity of exposition, we report only the coefficients and the z statistics for the variables of interest B and P . With a balanced panel (top panel in Table 5a ),
B is significant with a positive sign in equations 2, 6, 9 and 13. In all these equations, the macroeconomic variables (district employment rate and annual growth -d ) are omitted which would suggest that once we control for growth social benefits do not influence welfare. This same statement is not true if we consider the unbalanced panel. In 12 of the 16 welfare equations B is significant, including four equations where the macroeconomic variables are present (Table 5a) .
Similar results are found with the poverty equations (Table 5b ). With the balanced panel, P is significant in equations 2, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 16. In all these equations the macroeconomic variables are omitted. When we control for the economic cycle, the significance of social benefits disappears. However, with the unbalanced panel, in eight of the 16 poverty equations P is significant including four equations where the macroeconomic variables are present (Table 5b) .
Therefore, the unbalanced panel would suggest that the economic cycle is not sufficient to explain improvements in welfare and that social benefits may play a role.
Tables 5a and 5b used a random effects model. In order to test different estimation models, we have to exclude the time-invariant variables (rural and summer) which are not supported by the fixed effects model. Table 6a and 6b report the results for the balanced and unbalanced panel estimations and include the three estimation models considered (FE, RE and BE). As before, the exercise is repeated for the welfare and poverty equations. With the balanced panel estimations (Table 6a) , none of the social assistance variables is significant in either the welfare or poverty equations. With the unbalanced panel (Table 6b ) the social assistance variables are significant in equations 2, 3 and 4. Again, the difference is between balanced and unbalanced panel with the balanced panel suggesting no effect of social benefits and the unbalanced panel suggesting some effect. The balanced panel is more appropriate to assess the impact of benefits provided that the attrition rate, which is very large over the four years, does not bias the sample. Table A1 in the Annex reports the means for all variables and the t-test for means differences between balanced and unbalanced panels. The difference in means is generally rather small and below 10% across variables with most variables showing a gap below 20%. The t-test shows a significant difference between the balanced and unbalanced panels only for the rural and summer variables. In particular, for the variables of main interest (y, poor, B and P) the difference in means is never very significant. Moreover, the unbalanced panel largely 'pollutes' time effects with incomplete spells which is a serious shortcoming if annual macroeconomic shocks are responsible for explaining most of the variation in welfare which seems to be our case.
The Hausman tests reported on the bottom of Tables 6a and 6b speak also in favor of the FE model rather than the RE model and in the FE model used with the unbalanced panel the intensity of benefits variable ( is not significant. In substance, when we use the most appropriate model (FE), the most appropriate sample (balanced) and when we control for macroeconomic trends social assistance does not seem to have any positive and significant effect on welfare or poverty. This approach does not seem to have improved household welfare, all other factors being equal. If we ignore the questions of selection bias, behavioral responses, unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and measurement error, an incidence analysis would suggest that social benefits enhance the probability of moving out of poverty and reduce the probability of moving into poverty. However, double difference estimates and regression analyses which are able to control for at least some of these factors would suggest that social benefits have not contributed to improve welfare overall.
Double difference estimates show a negative impact on welfare. The main difference between the incidence and the double difference analyses as we structured them in this paper is that the incidence analysis simply compares the beneficiaries and non beneficiaries ignoring the question of comparability of the two groups whereas we used a matching procedure to carry out the double difference estimations. Comparing two homogeneous groups with the double difference procedure allowed us to observe that the non beneficiaries of social assistance benefits have performed better than the beneficiaries.
There may be both demand and supply side reasons which could explain the negative values we find with the double difference estimates. On the supply side, different distortions of the social assistance system such as a lack of transparency in the selection mechanism of beneficiaries or the use of categorical selection criteria resulted in distorted targeting. Targeting the non poor, in turn, may have had negative behavioral effects in terms of labor supply which could explain foregone income opportunities for those non poor who participated to the social assistance program. These problems may also have increased in weight during the period considered given that the volume of benefits increased without real restructuring of the targeting system. A second set of explanations may relate to the demand side through the mechanism of self-selection of beneficiaries. With the double difference procedure we compared two similar groups selected on the basis of observed characteristics. However, unobserved characteristics such as individual abilities may play an important role. It may be that the group of non beneficiaries is also the group with better individual abilities and which was able to better exploit the emerging growth opportunities. This problem is not really addressed by the matching procedure and the double difference estimates and motivated the panel approach that followed.
Panel survey estimates did not evidence any consistent significance of social assistance benefits in explaining welfare or poverty and pointed instead toward a strong growth effect.
Therefore, even when we take into account unobserved heterogeneity, social assistance benefits do not seem to explain poverty reduction. We can conclude that the real engine of poverty reduction in Moldova between 2001 and 2004 has been growth and that social assistance has had either a negative effect through a displacement effect (social assistance beneficiaries who would have done better without benefits) or a non significant role. 
